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ABSTRACT
A key challenge of democratic societies is to ensure a continuous flow of
information between the people and elites in order to secure representation
of citizen preferences. While there may be occasions where deviations from
citizen preferences are desirable, political systems with a sustained and
systematic mismatch between citizen opinion and policy would typically not
be considered democratic. Political parties have traditionally acted as key
channels of representation helping to transmit citizen preferences to policy-
makers. Yet their ability to secure democratic representation has been called
into question. The lecture explores the state of democratic representation in
Europe by presenting evidence from the GovLis Research Programme ‘When
does Government Listen to the Public’ on the link between public opinion
and policy on a large number of policy issues. Beyond parties, it explores a
series of alternative channels of citizen representation by considering the
ability of political institutions and engagement in civil society associations to
strengthen the link between public opinion and policy.
KEYWORDS Representation; policy responsiveness; associational engagement; interest groups; political
institutions
Many thanks for the opportunity to come to Limerick to give this lecture. It is a
real honor. As happy and proud I am to give the annual Peter Mair Lecture, I
am as sad that this annual lecture occurs because Peter is no longer among us.
Peter was not my PhD supervisor. He was also not my official mentor in the
Max Weber program at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence.
But he was an informal mentor in many respects. He was someone who
knew my two academic worlds at the time, first the EUI and subsequently
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Leiden University. I have benefited from several conversations with him about
a broad range of topics and not least from his support. In an obituary after
Peter’s death, written together with his Max Weber Fellows at the EUI, we
pointed out that, beyond Peter’s obvious scholarly contribution to the disci-
pline he was an excellent mentor. He was someone who believed and
spoke up for us, not least ‘[i]n those moments, in private as well as in
public, when we lacked conviction in our own voices’.1 I am someone who
has benefited from that during periods of my life that were more difficult
and so have several others. We also noted that, ‘When our time at the EUI
came to an end, our connections with Peter and the support we received
from him did not’. This was a real asset and I can say without any doubt
that I had not expected an academic world without him. I often regret that
I cannot introduce Peter to younger scholars, for whom I am sure he would
have been an inspiration as he was for me.
It should be noted though that Peter did not just support us. He also chal-
lenged us. He was somewhat less enthusiastic about the tendency for modern
political scientists to ask narrowly cast and specialized research questions
rather than focus on the big questions in our discipline. I heard him say
once that in the end all political scientists might end up as economists. It is
fair to say that this was a development, of which he was somewhat critical.
Today I will stick to his recommendation in the sense that I will address a
big question that concerned him a lot, especially towards the end of his
career. More specifically, I will speak about the state of policy representation
in Europe by looking at the links between the citizens of Europe and their pol-
itical representatives. Yet, I will also depart a bit from how Peter would prob-
ably have given this lecture and present some more narrowly cast research
that speaks to this broader question but has normative importance.
The challenge of democratic societies
Unfortunately, there is no lack of criticism that current political leaders are out
of touch with their voters and that politics is decided in closed circles within
the political establishment, removed from the citizens whom elected officials
are supposed to represent. Discussing Labour’s defeat in the 2015 General
Election in the UK, one of Miliband’s former campaign advisors Arnie Graf
argued that ‘Labour lost because of a disconnect between the party’s leader-
ship and its local representatives..[..] and weak relationships with the voters it
claimed to represent’.2 The quote underlines how democratic societies face
the challenge of ensuring a smooth and continuous flow of information
between the people and elites in order to ensure that citizens can form mean-
ingful opinions on current political events and that their opinions get articu-
lated to decision-makers. If this transmission process does not work well,
citizens may be uninformed about the evolution of the government agenda
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as well as legislation and unable to evaluate it. And even if citizens do have
opinions about the direction of future policy, a lack of information trans-
mission may make it hard for politicians to learn about these preferences.
Moreover, even if policy-makers are aware of the public’s preferences, the like-
lihood that they are held accountable for policy choices out of line with public
opinion may be low if these choices are not communicated to the people. As a
result, situations where the transmission of information between citizens and
elites does not function effectively should be likely to suffer from a lower
quality of policy representation.
Traditionally political parties have been seen as important channels of
information between citizens and the political system. In Easton’s (1957) clas-
sical model of a political system parties have the potential to act as intermedi-
ary organizations between citizens and the political institutions enabling
citizens to voice their concerns. Schattschneider also emphasized the role
which political parties can play in political representation as channels of
citizen preferences. He saw major parties as institutions that, as a result of
their electoral role, ‘consider public questions broadly […] taking a moderate
view of public policy…’. Consequently he argued, ‘they aim at inclusiveness.’
(1948, p. 17). In contrast, Schattschneider’s view of interest groups was less
positive. He explained how organized interests ‘characteristically organize
minorities’ (1948, p. 17) and that the interest group system as a whole
‘sings with a strong upper class accent’ (Schattschneider, 1960, pp. 34–35).
Though not uncritical of political parties altogether, Schattschneider therefore
argued that ‘..modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties.’
(1942, p. 1).
However, over time skepticism of the ability of parties to secure democratic
representation has grown. Peter Mair was one of the prominent voices in this
debate. Especially towards the end of his career, he became increasingly skep-
tical about the ability of parties to act as representative bodies. He saw an
increased tension between the governing and representative functions of pol-
itical parties (e.g. Mair, 2008, 2009, 2011). In his eyes, parties were no longer
the link between citizens as they once were because of declines in party mem-
bership and growing distrust in parties. Instead, parties had become more
strongly integrated into the state and focused on following established pro-
cedural norms and securing their own organizational survival (see also Katz
& Mair, 1995; van Biezen, 2014). According to Peter, the net result was a situ-
ation where ‘parties have moved from representing interests of the citizens to
the state to representing interests of the state to the citizens.’ (Mair, 2009, p. 6).
Peter was not the only one noticing and reflecting on these developments. In
a book chapter to an edited volume on ‘Parties and Democracy’ titled ‘Parties
Are Not What They Once Were’, Phillip Schmitter also emphasized how the
representative capacity of parties had decreased, not least as a result of
their weakened ability to aggregate societal interests. At the same time, he
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pointed out how attempts had been made to make up for some of the lost
ground by ‘substituting state funds for the decline in symbolic identifications
and voluntary contributions… ’ (2001, p. 84).
These seminal works leave us with important empirical questions: To what
extent is policy representation in Europe in a critical condition? And how det-
rimental is the changing role of parties for policy representation in general? In
order to try to answer these questions, my lecture has two aims. First, I will try
to diagnose ‘the state of citizen representation’ in Europe by giving an overview
of the relationship between what people want and get from their political
systems in Europe. Second, I will analyze the role of different factors in stimulat-
ing citizen representation. Beyond parties, I will explore a series of alternative
channels of citizen representation by considering the ability of political insti-
tutions and engagement in civil society associations to affect the link between
public opinion and policy.
The GovLis research program
The research I will refer to comes from the GovLis (‘When Does Government
Listen to the Public?’) Research Programme. It consists of two international
research projects on the link between public opinion and policy funded by
the Danish Council for Independent Research and the Netherlands Organiz-
ation for Scientific Research, of which I am the Principal Investigator.3 The pro-
jects began in the Autumn of 2013 but the idea dates back to a workshop on
Political Responsiveness at the Joint Sessions of the European Consortium for
Political Research in St Gallen in 2011. While it was clear to me that the litera-
ture on the opinion-policy linkage was impressive and included several
seminal contributions, it was also clear that there were still some potential
gaps to fill (for recent literature reviews, see Rasmussen, Reher, & Toshkov,
2018; Rasmussen, Romeijn, & Toshkov, 2018). First, most studies have
focused on either a single or low number of countries and/or policy
domains (e.g. Burstein, 2014; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008; Lax & Phillips,
2012; Soroka & Wlezien, 2004; Wlezien, 1995) making it difficult to generalize
and explore a series of factors that might affect the opinion-policy linkage at
both the country and policy level. Second, rather than focus on the specific
policy issues, on which decision-making typically takes place, a high
number of the existing studies have used broad measures of opinion and
policy, such as left-right ideology (Erikson, Mackuen, & Stimson, 2002; Gray,
Lowery, Fellowes, & McAtee, 2004; Stimson, Mackuen, & Erikson, 1995) or
measures at the level of broader policy domain (e.g. Bevan & Jennings,
2014; Jennings & John, 2009; Wlezien, 1995). Third, while research on the con-
ditioning factors of responsiveness has grown, I felt that there was still scope
to expand knowledge of several of these and to add new ones to the studies.
The extent to which additional factors affect the relationship between opinion
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and policy might ultimately affect our judgment of the state of democratic
representation.
Most importantly, the aim of the GovLis projects has been to theorize and
conduct empirical research on the role interest groups play in policy represen-
tation. This has, for example, been done through studies that have examined
the impact of associational engagement (Rasmussen & Reher, 2019), the
density of active interest groups (Bevan & Rasmussen, 2017), and the
opinion of the mobilized group community (Rasmussen, Binderkrantz, &
Klüver, 2019) on the opinion-policy linkage. GovLis studies have also looked
at other conditioning factors of policy representation, such as the impact of
political institutions (Rasmussen, Reher, et al., 2018) and patterns of party gov-
ernment and coalition conflict (Toshkov, Mäder, & Rasmussen, 2018). Finally, it
has examined potential inequalities in policy representation across gender
(Reher, 2018) and between party supporters and the general public
(Romeijn, 2018).
‘Representation’ is a multi-faceted concept (Pitkin, 1967) not easily
measured via a simple set of indicators (Sabl, 2015). Rather than attempting
to measure a series of different conceptualizations of representation, the
focus of the GovLis projects has been on what Pitkin has referred to as sub-
stantive representation, i.e. representation of citizens by ‘acting for’ them,
adopting decisions and policy ‘in the interest of the represented’ (Pitkin,
1967, p. 209). More specifically, our aim was to study the fit between govern-
ment policy and public opinion on specific policy issues. Such a focus does not
rule out that, in specific circumstances, there may be reasons for legislators to
deviate from what the majority of the public would want in their decisions in
order to protect minorities, fulfill international obligations, exert constitutional
restraint etc. Indeed, this is what Peter Mair himself has referred to as ‘respon-
sible’ as opposed to ‘representative’ government (Mair, 2009). Yet, the projects
rest on the idea that democracies should not experience sustained and sys-
tematic deviations between citizen preferences and government policies (Ras-
mussen, Reher, et al., 2018). Importantly, however, we do not just measure
policy representation by judging whether policy is aligned with the views
of the public majority, which I will explain in more detail below.
I will present findings from a couple of recent GovLis studies in my lecture
today. Rather than examining the dynamic relationship between opinion and
policy over time the first two studies I will talk about investigate the link
between the two in a cross sectional design (Rasmussen & Reher, 2019; Ras-
mussen, Reher, et al., 2018). We do not argue that causality between
opinion and policy only flows in one direction. In fact, one can both
imagine policy being affected by public opinion and opinion being affected
by what policy-makers are doing (see e.g. Wlezien, 1995). The first scenario
can be seen as ‘representation from below’ and in many ways represents
the classical view of ‘substantive representation’ presented by Pitkin and
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also conforms to what Peter Mair described as ‘representative government’
(see e.g. Mair, 2009). It might seem more controversial to regard the second
scenario, where citizens adjust their opinions to the behavior of policy-
makers, as an instance of representation; not least bearing in mind Peter
Mair’s critique of modern political parties. Yet, it is important to recognize
that an important task of political representatives and parties in democracies
is to present citizens with policy options and explain and justify them. This is
recognized, for instance, in the German Basic Law (Article 21 (1)): ‘Political
parties shall participate in the formation of the political will of the people.’
Such dynamics have been referred to as ‘representation from above’ (Esaias-
son & Holmberg, 1996). According to Holmberg,
[t]op down opinion formation is a legitimate form of politics in a democracy
characterized by free and fair elections and freedom of speech. Representation
run from above may sound a bit sinister, but it exists and we should not shy
away from it even if the phenomenon is not espoused in standard text books
on democracy… . (1997, pp. 280–281).
What is the state of policy representation in Europe?
Accordingly, I look at the link between opinion and policy at any given point in
time in my attempt to diagnose the state of policy representation in Europe. I
begin by presenting findings from a large study of 20 issues in 31 European
countries conducted together with Stefanie Reher and Dimiter Toshkov. Our
focus is on specific policy issues on which actual policy decisions are taken
as opposed to judging responsiveness within broader policy domains or for
polities as a whole. Examples of these issues include questions whether
same sex couples should be allowed to adopt, troops should be sent to Afgha-
nistan, and online voting should be used for elections and referenda (see
Table A1).
The issues were selected from cross-national, representative opinion
surveys from the period 1998–2013. We need to be aware of possible selec-
tion biases in which issues make it to opinion polls (Burstein, 2014). Issues
that make it into polls may be more likely to ‘concern matters of relatively
high salience’ (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 568). At the same time, this increases
the likelihood that these are issues ‘about which it is plausible that average
citizens may have real opinions.’ (Ibid., 568). Yet, to be able to control for
some of the most obvious biases in our analyses, our sample of issues is
selected in such a way that they represent different policy domains and
vary in media saliency (for more details on the selection procedure, see Ras-
mussen, Reher, et al., 2018).
In the study, we look at two measures of policy representation (see Lax &
Phillips, 2012). First, we look at whether policy is congruent with what the
majority of citizens prefer. Congruence can occur both when a policy is in
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place that a majority of citizens supports and when a policy that only a min-
ority of citizens backs is not adopted. Second, we regress the likelihood of a
policy being (partially) in place on the degree of public support for it. This
measure tells us something how about sensitive the likelihood of policy on
an issue being (partially) in place is to different degrees of public support
for them. According to this view, representation is not only about whether
policy conforms to the majority of the public, but also about whether its
likelihood of being in place is affected by differences in the actual level
of support for a given policy in the population. This measure goes
beyond drawing a simple distinction between whether it is in place or
not, as it distinguishes between whether the policy in question is fully, par-
tially or not in place. In the case of whether same sex couples should be
allowed to adopt, one can, for example, distinguish between cases where
adoption is not allowed, where couples can adopt each other’s children
Figure 1. Congruence scores across Europe. Source: Rasmussen, Reher, et al. (2018).
Notes: Darker shades indicate higher opinion-policy congruence.
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(i.e. ‘policy being partially in place’) and cases where they can adopt freely
(i.e. ‘policy being fully in place’).
Using this approach and these measures, what is the state of policy rep-
resentation in Europe? Looking at the first measure, we find that policy is con-
gruent with public opinion in 63% of the cases. Figure 1 shows the difference
in congruence scores for the included countries, ranging from 41% in Italy and
Poland to 100% in Iceland. The score for Ireland is 47%. While these differ-
ences might seem large, it should be pointed out that only a small share of
the variance in congruence in our study is related to countries. Instead, the
differences in congruence between issues are larger. Here we found a congru-
ence score for the issue of sending troops to Afghanistan as high as 100%
whereas the lowest score of 7% was found for the issue related warnings
on alcohol bottles (for more details, see Rasmussen, Reher, et al., 2018).
Our second measure of policy representation indicates a similar pattern.
We find a positive and significant relationship between the degree of
public support for a policy and the likelihood of the policy being (partially)
in place. Moreover, again there is limited variation in this relationship at the
country level, while we see substantial differences between the policy
issues. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate this. They show the relationship between
opinion and policy at the issue and country level, respectively. The plots are
based on the results of two separate multilevel ordinal regressions with
Figure 2. Predicted coefficients (log-odds) of public opinion on the policy being in place
for each policy issue with 95% confidence intervals. Source: Rasmussen, Reher, et al. (2018).
Notes: The dashed line indicates the mean coefficient across all issues.
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issues and countries at the second level respectively and where we allow the
relationship between opinion and policy to vary between cases at the second
level. We show in Figure 2 that the plotted slope co-efficients for the relation-
ship between opinion and policy at the issue level in the left-hand side panel
vary quite a bit. In contrast, Figure 3 shows that the same co-efficients calcu-
lated for the countries are much more similar with large confidence intervals
around the estimates (for more details, see Rasmussen, Reher, et al., 2018).
Overall, the picture this gives of the state of policy representation is perhaps
not as pessimistic as might have been feared based on some of the initial
quotes. Despite the declined representative potential of parties, we do find a
positive and significant relationship between support for a given policy and
the likelihood of it being (partially) in place. We also find an overall congruence
score between policy and the opinion of the majority of the public of 63%.
While this measure might not seem high, it is higher than what has been
found in similar research on the US, where policy was congruent with the
majority of the public approximately half of the time (Lax & Phillips, 2012).
Political institutions & policy representation
The perhaps most important question that follows from these results is what
then ultimately helps us explain potential variation in the state of policy
Figure 3. Predicted coefficients (log-odds) of public opinion on the policy being in place
for each country with 95% confidence intervals. Source: Rasmussen, Reher, et al. (2018).
Notes: The dashed line indicates the mean coefficient across all issues.
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representation? As mentioned, this is what most of our research in the GovLis
projects has dealt with. I will share insights with you with respect to a couple
of factors. The first is ‘the role of political institutions’. Institutions can be seen
as affecting both the incentive and capacity of policy makers to adopt policies
in line with the public. It is therefore not surprising that substantial attention
has been paid to them in both research on left-right congruence between
voters and politicians (e.g. Blais & Bodet, 2006; Ferland, 2016; Huber &
Powell, 1994; Powell, 2000) as well as research on policy responsiveness to
public opinion (e.g. Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008; Wlezien & Soroka, 2012).
While it might seem logical that institutions could potentially affect policy rep-
resentation, theorizing their precise role is somewhat less straightforward. For
many institutions, we might expect different effects on policy representation
depending on which mechanisms we focus on. This might also help explain
why the literature on institutions on policy representation has not reached
clear-cut conclusions but presented somewhat mixed findings. For example,
in the left-right literature on congruence, there has been a discussion about
whether PR systems lead to more representation or not (see e.g. Blais &
Bodet, 2006; Ferland, 2016; Huber & Powell, 1994). Similarly, one study of
actual policy responsiveness found that election system proportionality
weakens responsiveness (Wlezien & Soroka, 2012), whereas another one
found higher levels of responsiveness in Denmark’s proportional system
than in the UK plurality system (Hobolt & Klemmemsen, 2005).
We tested the impact of three types of institutions: the electoral system, the
horizontal division of power within the legislature and between legislative
and executive branches of government, and the vertical division of power
between different levels of government (Rasmussen, Reher, et al., 2018).
Rather than present one-directional hypotheses, we suggested that we
might expect countervailing effects of many of these types of institutions
on policy representation. While there may for example be a higher likelihood
that governments represent the median citizen in PR systems (e.g. Lijphart,
1994; Powell, 2006), such systems might also face difficulties in adopting
the policies citizens want. Hence, in PR systems the frequency of coalition gov-
ernments and need for compromise might be higher and the clarity of
responsibility lower (e.g. Tsebelis, 1995; Wlezien & Soroka, 2012). Similarly,
we can put forward countervailing hypotheses with respect to the effect of
horizontal divisions of powers. On the one hand, fewer checks and balances
and lower constraints on policy change in unicameral and systems with
strong parliaments might stimulate policy representation. On the other
hand, fewer constraints on decision-makers in such systems might actually
also enable decision-makers to ignore their citizens and adopt unpopular
policy changes (e.g. Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008; Tsebelis, 1995; Wlezien &
Soroka, 2012).
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Thus the same institutions may have different, possibly even countervail-
ing, effects on policy representation. In a cross-sectional analysis as ours, it
is therefore possible that there is no net effect of a given type of institution
on policy representation. The exception might be institutions specifying the
degree of vertical separation of powers: We would expect policy represen-
tation to be weaker in federal than unitary states, due to weaker information
flows between citizens and decision-makers and higher difficulty of assigning
responsibility in federal systems (Soroka & Wlezien, 2004). Similar patterns
might apply to countries that are members of the EU (Alexandrova, Rasmus-
sen, & Toshkov, 2016).
Overall, we find no net effect of institutions on policy representation in
our analysis of 20 issues in the 31 countries, no matter which of our
measures of policy representation we use (for more details, see Rasmussen,
Reher, et al., 2018). Irrespective whether we look at (a) the alignment of
policy with the opinion majority, or (b) the relationship between support
for a given policy and the likelihood that it is (partially in place), institutions
do not seem to matter. The exception is bicameralism, which has a signifi-
cant negative effect on whether policy is aligned with the public opinion
majority. Yet, it does not affect our other measure of policy representation,
and all the remaining institutional effects are insignificant; even the indi-
cators measuring the vertical separation of powers do not have a one-direc-
tional effect.
The fact that institutions do not affect policy representation in our study
should come as no surprise to us, given that the first results I showed indi-
cated that there is very little variation in policy representation across countries
to begin with. Ultimately, this means, of course, that any factor that varies at
the country level will have a hard time accounting for any variance. Yet, the
findings are remarkable, not least in the light of some of the existing research
on policy responsiveness, which has drawn stronger inferences on the role of
specific types of institutions on the opinion-policy linkage. Future research
should explore whether the difference in findings is related to the fact that
these studies conduct time series research of the link between opinion and
policy at the level of broader policy domains (e.g. Hobolt & Klemmensen,
2008; Wlezien & Soroka, 2012), whereas we examine the opinion-policy
linkage on specific policy issues at a given time.
Associational engagement & policy representation
The second factor, which I would like to discuss today, is associational engage-
ment and its impact on policy representation. As already noted, Schattschnei-
der did not have much faith in the ability of interest organizations to help
secure democratic representation. They were seen as representing special
interests and the interest group system as a whole was seen as biased.
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Peter Mair’s direct interest was not to study the role of associations. Yet, he
mentioned them in his critique of parties as representative bodies stating that,
The representation of citizens, meanwhile, to the extent that it occurs at all, is
increasingly given over to other, non-governing organizations and practices –
to interest groups, social movements, advocacy coalitions, lobbies, the media,
self-representation [..] that can talk directly to government and the bureaucracy.
(2011, p. 8).
Phillip Schmitter argued in 2001 that ‘there is no longer a priori reason to
suppose that parties should be privileged or predominant’ as ‘intermediaries’
between citizens and the state (2001, pp. 71–72). He explicitly mentioned
interest associations and social movements as alternative intermediaries
between citizens and policymakers.
The question is whether and to what extent these actors have a potential to
fulfill such a role. As mentioned, finding the answer to this question has been
one of the key aims of the GovLis projects. Rather than focus on individual
associations and their policy positions, I will focus on the role of associational
engagement in this lecture. Based on findings from a recent study published
by Stefanie Reher and myself (Rasmussen & Reher, 2019), I will look at whether
involvement of citizens in associations – through for example membership,
voluntary work and donations – affect the link between opinion and policy
on our specific policy issues.
Existing scholarship gives us reason to expect that associations may play a
positive role for policy representation. It has for long been emphasized how
associations contribute to democracy more broadly (Tocqueville, 1840). As an
example, Putnam’s seminal study of the Italian regions found a link between
the stock of social capital, of which citizen engagement is one of the key com-
ponents, and democratic performance in Italian regions (Putnam, 1993). Asso-
ciational engagement and social capital have also be shown to affect the
accountability of politicians (e.g. Claibourn & Martin, 2007; Jottier & Heyndels,
2012). In fact, we even have some evidence that it affects policy representation.
Verba and Nie’s seminal study ‘Participation in America’ (1972) found a link
between community activity (including membership in community problem-
solving organizations) and priority congruence between citizens and leaders
even if the effect was subject to certain contextual factors such as high voter
turnout (see also Berry, Portney, & Thomson, 1993; Hansen, 1975; Hill & Matsu-
bayashi, 2005). Instead, our focus is on the impact of associational engagement
on the relationship between opinion and actual policies on specific policy
issues.
In doing so we rely on the argument put forward by Boix and Posner that
associations might make citizens ‘sophisticated consumers of politics’ better
able to hold elites accountable (1998, p. 690). More specifically, we see civil
society associations as information transmitters between citizens and
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decision-makers that may help smooth the flow of information between citi-
zens and policy-makers that I referred to in the beginning of this lecture. First,
associational engagement may improve the public’s ability to form meaning-
ful preferences and hold politicians accountable. Second, information can also
be expected to improve both the ability and incentive of representatives to
respond to citizens.
Yet, we do not believe that all types of associational engagement matter
when examining policy representation on a specific policy issue. Instead, we
argue that the transmission capacity of associations is likely to be limited to
particular policy domains. Hence, we would primarily expect associations to
play a positive role in linking opinion and policy on issues that relate to
policy areas relevant to the associations (see also Bevan & Rasmussen, 2017;
Cohen, 2012). As an example, engagement in environmental associations
should play a role on issues that are relevant for them, such as nuclear
power and waste disposal, whereas it should not matter for other issues,
such as the introduction of a mandatory retirement age or the options for
same-sex couples to adopt. While we share the interest in associational
engagement with the social capital literature, our theoretical argument there-
fore also differs somewhat. Whereas the social capital literature typically looks
at the overall stock of associational engagement (e.g. Putnam, 1993) or dis-
tinguishes between engagement in different types of associations (for
example bridging and bonding ones, see Hill & Matsubayashi, 2005), we
expect an effect of engagement in organizations whose issue jurisdiction
matches the policy issues in question. To test our prediction, we use the
dataset of 20 issues across Europe and construct a measure of issue relevant
associational engagement by linking information on engagement in different
association types from eight surveys conducted between 1998 and 2011 with
our specific policy issues (see Table A1 and Rasmussen & Reher, 2019 for more
details).
In line with our expectations, we find that the larger the cumulative share
of citizens in a given country that are engaged in associations of relevance to a
given policy issue, the stronger the link between opinion and policy. The
effect is illustrated in Figure 4. It shows the relationship between public
support for a policy (x axis) and the likelihood of (a) ‘not having the policy’,
(b) ‘having the policy partially in place’ or (c) ‘having the policy fully in
place’ when associational engagement is low (left-hand side) and high
(right-hand side). As we would expect, the graphs differ quite a bit between
these two scenarios. We see that whereas there is no relationship between
opinion and policy when associational engagement is low, there is a strong
relationship when it is high. In the latter, support for a policy issue exerts a
strong positive effect on having the policy fully in place (bottom right
panel) and a strong negative one on not having the policy (top right panel).
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Altogether this provides support for the expectation that civil society
engagement affects the quality of democracy. However, we also show that
these effects are primarily limited to particular policy domains in which organ-
izations are active. The effect of general associational engagement disappears
when tested in a model together with issue-specific engagement (for more
details, see Rasmussen & Reher, 2019). Our findings underline that associ-
ations can play a role on policy issues beyond simply lobbying in favor and
against specific policies. Even though the extent to which associations
support a policy affects its likelihood of being (partially) in place (see also Ras-
mussen et al., 2019), engagement in them affects the actual link between
opinion and policy on an issue.
Political parties as representative bodies?
Finally, but perhaps most importantly, what is then the potential role of the
political parties themselves when it comes to acting as representative
bodies of the population? This is where we started the lecture and this is
exactly what Peter Mair had become increasingly skeptical about. Fortu-
nately, one of the many GovLis studies has looked into that question as
well. It is conducted by my colleague Jeroen Romeijn (Romeijn, 2018).
Rather than examine the linkage between opinion and policy as I have
Figure 4. Predicted probabilities of policy for low and high levels of specific associational
engagement. Source: Rasmussen and Reher (2019).
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been doing in the studies mentioned, Romeijn is looking at how closely the
positions of German parties match those of the public and their voters.
While a higher number of existing studies in the party politics literature
have examined the relationship between public opinion and party positions
(for a review, see Fagerholm, 2016), his study stands out by looking at
specific policy issues rather than ideological congruence. The issues come
from another GovLis dataset and are very similar to the ones I have pre-
sented and are selected based on similar criteria. Yet, rather than
measure a respondent’s attitude to a given policy, they explicitly measure
either support or opposition to potential policy changes of the existing
status quo. Altogether, the study looks at 102 issues about which the
German population was polled in the period 1998–2010 and it applies mul-
tilevel regression with poststratification to estimate the policy positions of
party supporters (see Romeijn, 2018 for more details).
Romeijn finds that party supporters and the general public agree on the
specific issues approximately 90% of the time. In the overwhelming majority
of cases where they disagree, parties tend to side with their own supporters
84% of the time. In addition, there is little evidence for a difference in how
closely the positions of niche and mainstream parties are linked to their sup-
porters and the general public. This is surprising because one might have
expected mainstream parties to have been most inclined to represent the
general public and niche parties to represent their supporters (Adams,
Clark, Ezrow, & Glasgow, 2006; Ezrow, De Vries, Steenbergen, & Edwards,
2011). Instead, niche parties are just more responsive to both.
Importantly, Romeijn finds an overall link between the position of the
public/ party supporters and the position taken by the political parties on a
given issue (for more details, see Romeijn, 2018). Hence, there is evidence
that party politicians present substantive views in line with those of their citi-
zens. At first, this might seem like good news from the perspective of democ-
racy. Yet, the findings get somewhat more critical when the study is broken
down to distinguishing between the responsiveness of government and
opposition parties to public opinion.
According to Figure 5, there is a fundamental difference in the extent to
which the positions of political parties are aligned with the citizens in these
two scenarios. While there is a strong positive relationship for opposition
parties (dashed line), the same graph for government parties (solid line)
is essentially flat. For the latter, there is no significant difference in the like-
lihood of supporting a given policy change. Hence, we see that irrespective
how strongly the public supports it the change, the likelihood that the gov-
ernment party supports it is only a little over 50%. The analysis with respect
to the link between party supporters and party positions shows the same
trend. Yet, while there is no relationship between the opinion of the
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general public and party positions, it is only weakened in the case of party
supporters.
Had Peter Mair been around, this might have been somewhat less surpris-
ing to him. He spoke of ‘a growing bifurcation in European party systems
between parties which claim to represent but don’t govern and those
which govern but no longer represent’ (2009, p. 17). In other words, he pre-
dicted how mainstream parties that often form governments have become
less responsive. A crucial question based on Peter Mair’s work is whether
this means that they have instead become ‘responsible’? This is not an easy
question to answer, not least because of the difficulty involved in judging
exactly what ‘being responsible’ means and its obvious normative
connotations.
Conclusion & future research gaps
Taken together the different GovLis studies present a somewhat less pessimistic
picture of policy representation in Europe than one might have expected based
on accounts by Peter Mair and others. Based on the largest cross-sectional study
on policy representation on specific issues in Europe to date, we can say that
opinion and policy are related (Rasmussen, Reher, et al., 2018; see also
Figure 5. Predicted probability of a position in favor of a policy issue for government
parties and opposition parties. Based on data from Romeijn (2018).
Note: Predictions for government (black line) and opposition (dashed gray line) parties with 95% confi-
dence intervals.
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Toshkov et al., 2018). We can also say that the actual state of policy is aligned
with the public opinion majority in 63% of the cases. Whether this is sufficient
for us to think that democratic representation is working well is an open ques-
tion. However, compared to comparable research on the US, where the likeli-
hood of policy congruence was similar to flipping a coin (Lax & Phillips,
2012), the odds of obtaining policy congruence in Europe are better than
chance. In addition, we know that it matters how large the majority of the
public supporting a given policy is for the likelihood that it is in place. The
higher the public opinion majority is, the more likely it is that the policy
exists (Rasmussen, Reher, et al., 2018). From a democratic standpoint, it
might seem reassuring that the public and policy-makers are more closely
aligned when the public is united in its stance on an issue than when it is
close to being perfectly divided.
While government support and public support for a given policy may be
unrelated (Romeijn, 2018), actual government responsiveness to public
opinion is not constrained by whether the policy changes considered are in
line with government positions. In another GovLis study on 306 policy
issues in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom, we show that govern-
ments are not less likely to consider public opinion in decisions on policy
changes that go against their own preferences (Toshkov et al., 2018). In that
study, there is also no support for the prediction that government coalition
conflict weakens responsiveness. In addition, we know from the first study dis-
cussed in this lecture that there is generally no net effect of political insti-
tutions on policy representation in Europe (Rasmussen, Reher, et al., 2018).
Instead, we found evidence that associations may have a role to play. We
nuanced some of the existing work on the impact of associational engage-
ment by emphasizing that, at least in the study of policy representation, its
impact is likely to be domain specific. Engagement in associations operating
within a policy jurisdiction of a given policy issue has a positive impact on
policy representation (Rasmussen & Reher, 2019). Given that engagement
might itself be stimulated by decision-makers, this leaves room for them to
actively capitalize on the transmitting function of associations by promoting
civil society engagement.
Yet, it is important to be aware that associations and other types of interest
groups may not only strengthen but also weaken the opinion-policy linkage
through their lobbying efforts. A related GovLis study of 160 policy issues in
Denmark and Germany indicates that policy is significantly less likely to be
aligned with the public majority when interest groups and the public are
on opposite sides on a policy issue. Yet, it also demonstrates that the effect
is relatively small in substantial terms and that the ability of groups to
influence whether the public majority gets what it wants is restricted to
cases where the public aims at changing the policy status quo (for more
details, see Rasmussen et al., 2019). Together these different GovLis studies
IRISH POLITICAL STUDIES 343
underline the importance of adding associational engagement and interest
groups to the study of policy-making, which has been one of key goals of
the GovLis projects (see also Rasmussen, Mäder, & Reher, 2018; Flöthe &
Rasmussen). They complement recent work on groups and responsiveness
(Giger & Klüver, 2016; Klüver & Pickup, 2019) and have since been followed
up by similar research on the EU and Belgium by Iskander de Bruycker and
Evelien Willems and by an ongoing international project on interest groups,
public opinion and policy agendas conducted by Joost Berkhout, Patrick Bern-
hagen, Adam Chalmers, Beth Leech and Amy McKay.4
There is much scope for additional research with respect to teasing out the
casual mechanism through which interest groups affect policy representation.
While it is often assumed that submission of information and other resources
by groups play a key role, these resources are typically not directly measured
in the studies. My GovLis colleague Linda Flöthe’s work is promising in this
respect. While she does not directly test the role of information submission
by groups on the link between public opinion and policy, she systematically
maps information flows from groups to policy-makers on specific issues and
explains variation in them. From her work on Germany, we know that in
addition to providing technical expertise, groups frequently submit infor-
mation about public preferences and that such information is submitted
by different types of interest groups (see e.g. Flöthe, 2019). This leaves
groups with at least the potential to act as transmission belts between
the public and policy-makers (see Junk, 2019 on the transmission capacity
of umbrella associations). Moreover, it opens the opportunity for additional
research on the extent to which they help close the gaps in information
flows between citizens and policy-makers that I talked about in the begin-
ning of this lecture with the example of the Labour party in the 2015 British
General Election.
The question is whether Peter Mair would ultimately have been satisfied
with the level of policy representation identified in our studies? Confronted
with the contents of this lecture, he would probably have reminded us of the
complexities entailed in defining policy representation in the first place (see
also Sabl, 2015). It is likely that how desirable responsible and responsive gov-
ernment is might depend on one’s understanding of democratic represen-
tation. Had Peter been with us he would probably also have been aware of
the flourishing new research agenda, which looks at inequality in policy rep-
resentation. Such research often points out that, while policy representation
might look promisingwhenwe consider the opinion of citizens at an aggregate
level, such results often mask potential inequalities between subgroups of the
population, such asmen andwomen (e.g. Reher, 2018) and incomegroups (e.g.
Gilens, 2012; Peters & Ensink, 2015). It is beyond doubt that policy represen-
tation is a highly complex entity to examine and that understanding its
different dimensions may require using multiple conceptualizations, analysis
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designs, methodologies and data sources. In this lecture I have explored some
of our recent attempts. I hope they will serve as a stepping stone for further
research and ultimately help us give better answers to one of the biggest ques-
tions Peter Mair encouraged me to ask.
Notes
1. ‘In Memory of our Mentor Peter Mair’, 23 August 2011, Orbituary written by Peter
Mair’s Max Weber Fellows 2006–2011, available at: https://blogs.eui.eu/
maxweberprogramme/peter-mair/ (accessed 18.03.2019).
2. Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/arnie-graf-labour-
was-so-out-of-touch-it-didnt-know-a-single-worker-on-the-minimum-wage-
says-10436910.html (accessed 19.03.2019).
3. See www.govlis.eu for more information about the project.
4. See http://www.uni-stuttgart.de/soz/avps/aig/Presentation.Symposium_PS.pdf.
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Appendix
Table A1. List of policy issues and related associations.
Policy issue Associations
Warnings on alcoholic drink bottles Health and patient organizations
Experiments on animals Environmental and animal rights organizations
Smoking bans in bars and pubs Health and patient organizations
Tobacco vending machines Health and patient organizations
Embryonic stem cell research Religious organizations; health and patient organizations
Nuclear power Environmental and animal rights organizations
Nation-wide minimum wage Trade unions; business and industry associations
Support for caregivers Health and patient organizations; elderly rights organizations
Detaining terrorist suspects without
charge
Human rights organizations
Same-sex marriage Religious organizations; human rights organizations
Adoption of children by same-sex
couples
Religious organizations; human rights organizations
Abortion Religious organizations; human rights organizations
Citizenship (Ius soli) –
Progressive income tax Trade unions; business and industry associations
Right to earn while receiving a
pension
Trade unions; business and industry associations; elderly rights
organizations
Asylum seekers’ right to work Human rights organizations
On-line voting –
Military involvement in Afghanistan Human rights organizations
Mandatory retirement age Trade unions; business and industry associations; elderly rights
organizations
Disposal of plastic waste in landfills Environmental and animal rights organizations
Sources: Rasmussen, Reher, et al. (2018) and Rasmussen and Reher (2019).
IRISH POLITICAL STUDIES 349
